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Hill v. Community of Damien of
Molokai and the Character of the
Community: Social Policy, Group
Residences, and Real CoVenants
I. Introduction
Deinstitutionalization aims to achieve the goal of returning
individuals with mental disabilities to the community at large.' In
1963, President John F Kennedy declared that mentally ill and
retarded persons must be returned to the community "to restore
and revitalize their lives."2  Fifteen years later, a President's
Commission reported that the residential character of neighbor-
hoods was destroyed by "ghettoes" of mentally disabled and that
the right of such persons to live in "normal residential surround-
ings" was seriously affected by the clustering of group homes.3
The effect of such ghettoes is felt not only by the mentally
disabled,4 but also by neighboring homeowners whose property
may disintegrate in character and value.5 Enforcement of restric-
1. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters, and Congregate Housing: Deinstitu-
tionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 416
(1986) (discussing that the goal of deinstitutionalization is "to shift the focus of treatment"
to "home environs").
2. Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Retardation, PUB. PAPERS 137
(Feb. 5, 1963).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 1390 (1978).
4. See Daniel Lauber, A Real LULU: Zoning for Group Homes and Halfway Houses
under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 369, 385 (1996)
(explaining that clustering of group homes creates "de facto social service district[s],"
frustrating the goals of community integration and the reduction of the institutional
atmosphere).
5. See ALVIN ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR'S DESKBOOK § 2.03[3] (3rd. ed. 1994)
(explaining that reduction of the market analysis component of property appraisal includes
the identification of social characteristics of the neighborhood and of trends likely to
continue in the future). But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF ZONING
AND OTHER PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE
MENTALLY DISABLED 9 (1983) (reporting that the objection to inevitable decline in property
values, which is common prior to the opening of a group home, was seldom mentioned after-
wards).
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tive real covenants commonly formed in residential subdivisions is
a popular preventive measure against alleged devaluation; however,
this avenue of relief has proven dangerous.
6
Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai,7 a recent New
Mexico Supreme Court case, is the latest in a nationwide group of
decisions addressing whether single family residence real covenants
are enforceable to prevent the use of property as a community
residence.8 The Hill decision is significant because its analysis
follows a recent trend in real covenant jurisprudence in which
judicial construction of single family covenants and the application
of legal theories are used by courts to refuse enforcement of
covenants.9 The decision is also representative of the growing
scrutiny of single family restrictions under the anti-discrimination
protections of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Finally, it is a portent
of federal agency forays into the enforcement of the FHA against
complaining homeowners.
This comment examines Hill and the bases of its holdings,
analyzes the trends in group home covenants cases in light of the
purposes and effects of such homes, and scrutinizes the Fair
Housing Act and its 1988 Amendments as applied in covenants
cases. Additionally, this comment considers the effects of federal
investigations and prosecutions of persons who choose to sue to
enforce their facially valid covenants and contemplates proposed
reforms.
II. Hill v. Community: A Textbook Case
A. The Suit to Enforce the Covenant
In December 1992, the Community of Damien of Molokai
("Community"), a private, non-profit corporation that provides
homes to individuals with AIDS, leased a residence in a planned
subdivision of Albuquerque, New Mexico, called Four Hills
Village. °  Subsequently, four unrelated individuals took up
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. 911 P.2d 861 (N.M. 1996).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 870-71.
10. See id. at 864-65. As did the Hill court, this comment uses the term "AIDS" to
encompass both Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and the presence of the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV-positive). See id. at 864 n.1. The Hill court suggests Baxter
v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 724-26 (S.D. Ill. 1989) for a thorough discussion of
HIV and AIDS.
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residence in the home and required in-home nursing care."
William Hill III, Derek Head, Charlene Leamons, and Bernard
Dueto ("Neighbors"), lived in homes on the same cul-de-sac as the
Community's group home. 2 Shortly after the group home began
operation, the Neighbors noticed an increased amount of traffic
resulting from the operation of the home. 3 The Neighbors
believed that the Community's use of the house violated one of the
restrictive covenants applicable to the sixteenth installment of Four
Hills Village, which encompasses the Neighbors' and the Communi-
ty's homes. 4 In relevant part the covenant provided:
No lot shall ever be used for any purpose other than single-
family residence purposes. No dwelling house located thereon
shall ever be used for other than single family residence
purposes, nor shall any outbuildings or structure located
thereon be used in a manner other than incidental to such
family residence purposes. The erection or maintenance or use
of any building, or the use of any lot for other purposes,
including, but not restricted to such examples as stores, shops,
flats, duplex houses, apartment houses, rooming houses, tourist
courts, schools, churches, hospitals, and filling stations is hereby
expressly prohibited. 5
In 1993, the Neighbors filed for an injunction to enforce the
covenant and prevent the Community's use of the property as a
group home. 6 The Neighbors specifically charged that the term
"single family residence" did not encompass group homes in which
unrelated people live together. 7 The Community defended on
the ground that the use was not prohibited by the covenant, or,
alternatively, that enforcement of the covenant would be a violation
of the FHA.' The Community also counterclaimed for a perma-
nent injunction against enforcement of the covenant and recovery
of attorney's fees.' 9 After two hearings, the trial court held that





16. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 865.
17. See id.
18. See id. The FHA is federal legislation that provides for fair housing by prohibiting
discrimination in public and private housing based on race, color, religion, national origin,
gender, and disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601-19 (1988).
19. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 865.
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the covenant prohibited the use of the house as a group home and
issued a permanent injunction against the Community.2° The
court entered specific findings that the use as a group home
generated a significant amount of increased traffic on the street
that detrimentally altered the character of the neighborhood.2'
The Community appealed the trial court's order to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, which reviewed claims regarding both the
interpretation of the restrictive covenant and the applicability of
the FHA.22
B. The Appeal: Covenant Rulings
In refusing to enforce the Four Hills covenant, the New
Mexico Supreme Court followed established rules of construc-
tion.' In this regard, the court noted its duties to resolve ambigu-
ous language against restrictions and in favor of the free enjoyment
of the property, to not read restrictions on the use of the land into
the covenant by implication, to interpret reasonably but strictly,
and to give words within the covenant their ordinary meaning.24
In construing the covenant, the court first found incorrect as
a matter of law the trial court's determination that the Communi-
ty's use of the house was closer to a commercial endeavor than a
residential one.25 Noting that the group home setting is intended
to provide social, emotional, and financial support, the court
dismissed the use of contracted private nursing, meal preparation,
and shopping services as "the same services to which any disabled
individual would be entitled regardless of whether he or she lived
in a group home or alone in a private residence., 26 The court also
stated that the Community's administrative role in the operation of
the home did not render it a nonresidential operation.27 Despite
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. The FHA prevents housing discrimination against persons with disabilities.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (1988). See also infra Part IV.
23. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 865-66 (citing Cain v. Powers, 668 P.2d 300, 302 (N.M. 1983).
See also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 9 (1965) (noting the
standard application of the rules of construction).
24. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 865-66. See also Knudtson v. Trainor, 345 N.W.2d 4 (Neb.
1984); Pirtle v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Long v. Branham, 156 S.E.2d 235
(N.C. 1967).
25. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 866-67.
26. Id. at 866.
27. See id.
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the fact that Community workers scheduled and supervised health
care workers, received donations on behalf of the residents,
collected rents from the residents, and enforced drug and alcohol
policies, the court noted as conclusive that no Community workers
actually resided in the home. Focusing on the purpose of the
home to provide a "traditional family structure and atmosphere,"
the court held that as a matter of law the Community's use was
residential and in compliance with the covenant.29
Next, the court concluded that the four unrelated residents of
the Community's group home constituted a single family as
required by the covenant.3 ° Because the covenant itself did not
define "family," the court declared that the term was ambiguous.3'
Resolving that ambiguity in favor of free use of the property, the
court refused to limit the term family to individuals related by
blood or law.32  Relying on the Albuquerque zoning ordinance,
33
interpretations of policies behind the FHA,34 state policy as
expressed in the New Mexico Developmental Disabilities Act,35
28. See id. at 866-67.
29. Id. at 867.
30. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 867-69.
31. See id. at 867. This resolution seems strained when the term's use is given the
meaning clearly intended by the drafting developer in 1973. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 867. (quoting ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., REV. ORDINANCES art. XIV, § 7-14-
5(B)(41) (1974 & Supp. 1991)). The ordinance includes within the definition of "family"
"any group of not more than five [unrelated] persons living together in a dwelling." Id.
34. See id. at 868. The court relied on United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555 (Okla.
1992); and Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.
Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
In Scott, the United States filed an action on behalf of homeowners, alleging that the
defendants violated the Fair Housing Act by interfering with the homeowner's right to sell
their home to an organization that operated group homes for the disabled. See Scott, 788
F.Supp. at 1556. The court, in holding that interfering with the sale fell with the Act's
proscription against discrimination against the handicapped, noted that "[t]he legislative
history of the Fair Housing Act reflects the national policy of deinstitutionalizing disabled
individuals and integrating them into mainstream society." Id. at 1561 n.5; see also infra
notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
In Support Ministries, the court addressed a community's efforts to prevent the
opening of a residence for homeless individuals suffering from AIDS. See Support Ministries,
808 F. Supp. at 122. The court concluded that a reading of the legislative history of the Fair
Housing Act revealed that persons with AIDS were intended to be included in the definition
of handicapped. See id. at 129.
35. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 868 (citing N.M.S.A. 1978, § 28-16A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1995)
(expressing the state policy in favor of integration of the disabled and specifically providing
for inclusion into residential communities)).
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and the state's grant of zoning authority to municipalities,36 the
court adopted an expansive definition of the term "family" so as to
avoid the covenant's purported bar against group homes.3"
Finding that the group home exhibited the "stability, permanency
and functional lifestyle ... equivalent to that of the traditional
family unit,' 38 the court held that the unrelated adult AIDS
patients were indeed a family.39
C. The Appeal: FHAA Rulings
Although the court ruled in favor of the Community's on the
covenant claim, the court reversed the FHA claim.4" Noting that
the trial court made no express holding on the applicability of the
federal legislation, the supreme court inferred that the lower court
had concluded that a facially neutral restriction, equally applicable
to disabled and non-disabled persons, does not implicate the
FHA.41 Exercising its power to draw its own legal conclusions,42
the court reviewed the Community's claim under the federal statute
and concluded that even if the community residence had been
found to not violate the covenant, the restriction itself would
violate the FHA.43
36. See id. at 868 (citing N.M.S.A. 1978, § 3-21-1(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1995) (providing that
state-licensed or state-operated community residences for mentally ill or developmentally
disabled are residential uses for zoning purposes and are permitted within zones for
residential, single-family dwellings)).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 869-70 (citing Open Door Alcoholism Program, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
491 A.2d 17, 21-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)). In Open Door, the court noted that
the controlling factor in determining whether an unrelated cohabiting group constitutes a
family is "whether the residents bear the generic character of a relatively permanent
functioning family unit." Open Door, 491 A.2d at 21.
39. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 869.
40. See id. at 871.
41. See id. The trial court noted that enforcement of the covenant's restriction is not
discriminatory when its application would preclude the use of a subject house as "a halfway
home in criminal rehabilitation, as a home for recovering alcoholics, as a home for homeless,
as a home for unwed mothers, as a home for battered spouses, as a home for delinquent
children, as a home for single white males, or as a home for handicap [sic] people as defined
by ... federal statutes." Id.
42. See id. (citing C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 244 (N.M.
1991). ("[An appellate court need not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law and, upon
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In reaching its conclusion, the court reviewed the nature of the
Community's claims under section 3604(f) of the FHA,44 which
makes it unlawful to discriminate against persons with disabilities
with respect to housing.45 The section further provides that
"discrimination includes ... a refusal to make reasonable accom-
modations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling., 46 The court observed
that section 3604(f) has been widely interpreted as creating three
distinct claims for violation: (1) discriminatory intent, (2) disparate
impact, and (3) failure to reasonably accommodate.47
A claim of discriminatory intent requires a court to inquire
whether a defendant has treated disabled individuals differently
from other similarly situated individuals. 4 To prevail, a plaintiff
need only show that the handicap of the potential residents was in
some part the basis for the policy being challenged.49 While some
federal courts have held that the efforts to enforce a facially neutral
restrictive covenant for the purpose of keeping disabled individuals
out of the neighborhood was a discriminatory intent violation of
the FHA," the court in Hill reached the opposite conclusion.5"
On the other hand, the court reached a different result with regard
to the remaining two claims.
A plaintiff pleading a disparate impact claim must prove only
that the defendant's conduct actually or predictably results in
discrimination or has a discriminatory effect.52 Effect, not motiva-
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1988); Hill, 911 P.2d at 874. Community also raised a claim
under § 3617 of the FHA making it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of... any right granted or protected by sec-
tion ... 3604 ... of this title." Id. The court, however, declined to address that claim. See
Hill, 911 P.2d 871-72 n.3.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
46. Id. § 3604(f)(4).
47. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 872.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 872-73. In Hill, the Neighbors contested neither that persons with AIDS
are considered disabled within the framework of the FHA nor that the Community had
standing to sue under the Act. See id. at 872.
50. See id. at 872. The court held that the Neighbor's complaint about the traffic, which
began only days after a newspaper article describing the use of the group home, was
insufficient to support a claim of discriminatory intent. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 872-73 (citing Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc.
v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)).
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tion, is the test.53 A balancing test established by the Seventh
Circuit was adopted by the supreme court. The factors to be
balanced when evaluating such a claim are: (1) the strength of
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory impact, (2) the presence of any
evidence of discriminatory intent, (3) the nature of defendant's
interest in taking the challenged action, and (4) whether plaintiff is
seeking to compel defendant to affirmatively provide housing to the
disabled or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with
landowners who wish to provide this housing.54 The Hill court
drew attention to the trial court's failure to examine any of the
above factors and the fact that it overlooked case law demonstrat-
ing that it is "well established" that the FHA prohibits enforcement
of covenant restrictions that have the effect of discriminating on the
basis of a handicap.55
Applying the test to the facts at hand, the court concluded that
because the covenant attempted to restrict group homes, it had the
effect of denying housing to the disabled, who frequently require
such arrangements; that any evidence of discriminatory intent was
equivocal at best; that the defendant's interest served in enforcing
the covenant was legitimate but purely private; and that Communi-
ty "simply" sought to prevent Neighbors from interfering with its
proposed use of the house.56 The court then concluded that the
negative effect of the group home, increased traffic, was out-
weighed by the Community's interest in operating a group home
for persons with AIDS.57 The Community had proved disparate
impact, and the Neighbors were precluded on that basis from
enforcing the covenant against the Community.
58
The court reached a similar conclusion concerning the claim
that the defendants failed to make a reasonable accommodation.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 873 (citing Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)).
55. See id. at 873; see also Deep E. Texas Reg'l Mental Health & Mental Retardation
Serv. v. Kinnear, 877 S.W.2d 550, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding enforcement of
restrictive covenant violated FHA).
56. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 873-74. The court concluded that the first and fourth factors
weighed heavily in favor of the Community's position, the second was equivocal and the
third weighed lightly in favor of the Neighbors because private as opposed to public interests
were being served. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 875 (citing United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223, 228-30
(E.D. Pa. 1993)).
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Under section 3604(f)(3)(B), an accommodation is not reasonable
"if it would require a fundamental alteration in the nature of a
program, or if it would impose undue financial or administrative
burdens on the defendant." 59 To implicate the reasonable accom-
modation requirement, the restriction must be an impediment to a
disabled plaintiff who is denied access to housing.6
The court found that "a reasonable accommodation would
have been not to seek enforcement of the covenant," because the
group home would not impose any administrative or financial
burdens on the Neighbors, and because nonenforcement of the
covenant would not fundamentally undermine the goals of its
protections.6" Therefore, the reasonable accommodation prong of
the FHA also prohibited enforcement of the restrictive covenant
because such enforcement would have prevented the use of the
house as a group home for persons with AIDS.
62
Finally, the court upheld the dismissal of the Community's
counterclaim for a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
covenant and for attorney's fees.63 In so doing, the court pointed
to the Neighbors' non-discriminatory justification, the trial court's
findings of the impact by the group home on the neighborhood,
and the unlikelihood of future conduct by the Neighbors in
violation of the Community's rights or in contravention of the
court's order. 4
III. Analysis of Subdivision Covenants and Judicial Reasoning
Several state courts have adjudicated questions similar to those
in Hill, which is representative of a common theme among these
cases. Community residences 65 assume various incarnations and
employ differing forms of ownership and operation.' Restrictive
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Hill, 911 P.2d at 876. The court held that the goal of covenants are to regulate
aesthetics and to prohibit commercial uses, not to control traffic density. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 877.
64. See id.
65. Part III uses the term "community residence" to include generally group homes,
including several appellations such as elder care, family care, and domiciliary care, and other
group living arrangements primarily for persons with disabilities. The phrase is taken from
Lauber, supra note 4, at 369-70. However, this comment excludes hospices and halfway
houses and makes the general exception for more clearly commercial enterprises and those
with more transient populations.
66. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
1998]
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covenant 67 clauses and phrases are as multifarious as their draft-
ers. Analysis by courts inevitably include conclusory, institutional
elements. 68 Inconsistencies in covenant litigation necessarily flow
from these conditions. 69 Courts do, however, strictly scrutinize the
facts before concluding that the restrictions may not be enforced,
despite the fact that the general attributes shared by community




Community residences are difficult to categorize. They grew
in number in the late 1960's as a popular answer to institutional
living arrangements, which were increasingly disapproved of as
awareness of the nature and effect of certain disabilities increased
and people with handicaps were seen as capable of living normal-
ized lives. 71 The community residence may be home for children
or adults, ranging between three and twelve or more residents.
72
The community residence may have live-in supervisors, such as a
married couple, or a paid care staff, and it is usually located in a
residential neighborhood to enhance its familial qualities. 73
Residents may include the mentally retarded,7n the mentally ill,7
5
delinquent or troubled children, 76 recovering alcoholics or ad-
dicts,77 AIDS patients, 78 or the dependent elderly.79 The resi-
dences may be operated by entities for profit, by non-profit
67. "Covenant" here is used to encompass both real covenants and equitable servitudes.
68. See Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning in the Law of
Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV. 33, 62 (1981).
69. See id. at 60.
70. See id. at 60-62.
71. Lauber, supra note 4, at 371-72. Hence, the deinstitutionalization movement. See
id.
72. See id.
73. See Brussack, supra note 68, at 46-47.
74. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City/Long Island Co. SVCS Group,
460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Livonia v. Dept. of Social Services, 378 N.W.2d 402 (Mich. 1985).
76. See, e.g., Christ United Methodist Church v. Municipality of Bethel Park, 428 A.2d
745 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning &
Appeals, 380 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1978).
77. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
78. See, e.g., Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861 (N.M. 1996).
79. See, e.g., Hagemann v. Worth, 782 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1989). See generally PATRICIA
B. POLAK ET AL., AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE
REPT. NO. 420, COMMUNITY BASED HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY 25-29 (1989).
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organizations, or by the state itself.8" The sponsoring organization
normally owns or leases the house in which the residence is
established.8' Opposition to the residences generally takes the
form of litigation based on alleged violation of either zoning
ordinances or restrictive covenants. 82  The zoning cases are
numerous,83 and many states have enacted legislation permitting
group homes to fall within the definition of a "single-family
dwelling."'
B. Subdivision Covenants and Their Application to Community
Residences
Subdivision covenants generally reflect the same developer
concerns, such as retention of architectural compatibility85 and
traditional family character,86 exclusion of commercial presenc-
es,87 and control of population density.88  The covenants them-
selves resemble one another in structure, if not in language.89
80. See Brussack, supra note 69, at 47.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 47-48.
84. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.583(b) (Supp.1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 462.357 (7) (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 76-2-314 (1979); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 59.97(15) (West Supp. 1981).
85. Such a clause will read to the effect that "[n]o buildings shall be erected ... or
permitted to remain on said real property other than single ... family dwellings not to
exceed two and one-half stories in height and private garages for not more than two cars."
Blevins v. Barry Lawrence County Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Mo.
1986).
86. Family character is protected by clauses such as "[n]o lot shall be used except for
residential purposes." Omega Corp. of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 728, 729 (Va.
1984). More explicit language such as "[n]o lot shall ever be used for any purpose other than
single family residence purposes" is also employed. Hill, 911 P.2d at 865. Circuitous
language such as "[alll lots in the tract shall be known and described as residential lots" is
also used. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Okla. 1985). It is commonly said of
them that "[t]he enforcement of th[ese] covenant[s] does nothing more than preserve to the
homeowners the residential character of the neighborhood." Hagemann v. Worth, 782 P.2d
1072, 1074 (Wash. 1989).
87. This restriction may be an express one against business or commercial use, or may
be implied from the "residential use only" covenant. "The term business is the antonym of
residential ...." Hagemann, 782 P.2d at 1075.
88. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 870 (noting that "[niot one of the fifteen
provisions ... attempts to control the number of automobiles that a resident may
accommodate on or off the property nor the amount of traffic a resident may generate.").
89. The general purpose of covenants is to enhance and maintain property values. See
Hageman, 782 P.2d at 1073. The covenants in Hageman, which were recorded with the plat
of the golfing community subdivision, included a declaration that the restrictions were
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Covenants are generally challenged on four broad grounds: (1)
specified structure, (2) specified use, (3) the definition of family,
and (4) public policy limits on enforcement.90
Restrictions to "single-family dwellings" may fall within either
"use" or "structure" provisions of covenants. For example, when
a restriction mandates that "[a]ll structures shall be constructed of
brick or stone veneer at least window sill height all the way
around . . . ," and then "[n]o structure shall be erected, altered,
placed, or permitted to remain.., other than one detached single-
family dwelling, ' '91 it is likely to be held to be structural or
architectural in nature.9 2 As long as the operator of a community
residence has made no alterations that clearly take the structure
beyond the aesthetic constraint, this type of restriction is not
violated.93 Fewer barriers to community residences are found in
this type of restriction than in "use" restrictions.94
There are two general categories of covenants that purport to
prescribe the use to which lots or structures within the subdivision
are to be put. The first limits the property to residential use or
residence purposes or from business or commercial uses; the second
invokes the phrase single-family dwelling in its constraint.95 Of
course, hybrid forms also exist.96 Despite the apparent clarity of
intended to "preserve and enhance the values and amenities of the area." Id. Consider also
that many such subdivisions include floor building costs for homes with the development.
See Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City/Long Island Co. SVCS Group, 460 N.E.2d
1336, 1338 (N.Y. 1984) (regarding covenants providing for minimum dollar value construction
costs).
90. JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, 433-36 (1993).
91. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021-22.
92. See id. at 1022.
93. See id. at 1022-23 (holding that the addition of a full bathroom, three closets, a
second rear door, and a rear fire ladder does not take structure out of meaning of "single-
family dwelling"). But cf. Hagemann, 782 P.2d at 1073 (holding that the structure of
octagonal house with eleven bedrooms and six bathrooms remodeled to meet state fire
protection standards was a violation of a structural covenant not in question).
94. There may be little distinction between the phrasings. See Hagemann, 782 P.2d at
1075 ("[T]erm business is the antonym of residential."); Knudtson v. Trainor, 345 N.W.2d
4, 6 (Neb. 1984) (residential building is "one in which people reside or dwell ... as
distinguished from one which is used for commercial or business purposes.").
95. Phrasings surrounding the term may not be determinative. For example, the phrase
"used for single-family residence purposes only" may be interpreted to be a use clause, as
ordinary meaning would seem to dictate, but it has been strictly construed to be merely a
restriction upon types of buildings. See Sissel v. Smith, 250 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ga. 1978).
96. See Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) ("The covenant in
question provides that all lots shall be used for residential purposes only and states that a
residence shall be construed to be a single family dwelling.") (internal quotation marks
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the developer's intent to create a traditional-family, low-density,
stable-valued subdivision, courts tend to decide the effect of such
phrases with what has been called "an almost complete neglect of
contextual social meaning."97 The argument has been successfully
made that the owner or lessor operating a community residence is
engaging in a business or commercial enterprise in contravention
of the restriction.98 Nonetheless, most jurisdictions have held that
indicia of commercial enterprise are "incidental necessities" and not
conclusive of covenant violation." Detailed accounting proce-
dures, record keeping, management, supervision, and personal care
of residents for monetary compensation are commonly held to be
collateral to the primary purpose of maintaining a familial house-
keeping unit and not to transform the character of the home from
residential to commercial."°°
In those situations in which the term "family" defines the
prescribed use, courts are most likely to stretch the meaning of the
word or abandon it altogether. At least one court, however, has
expressly circumscribed the issue by holding that when the
covenant itself does not define the term, strict construction
demands that the phrase be interpreted to relate to the structure
rather than the use of the property.10 1 Most other courts have
met the undefined term head-on and declared that the term
"family" encompasses six mentally retarded children and a foster
parent;1  an administrator, staff of caretakers, house manager,
and two to five adult residents; t°3 and a paid housekeeper and
five mentally retarded adult women;'°4 among others. However,
in Crane Neck Association v. New York City,"°5 a New York
appellate court admitted that a unified housekeeping unit, despite
omitted).
97. Brussack, supra note 68, at 63. Brussack contends that it is quite unlikely that a
"well-socialized speaker of English" would conclude that community residences fall within
the ambit of subdivision families. See id.
98. See, e.g., Hagemann, 782 P.2d at 1075.
99. See, e.g., J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 274 S.E.2d
174, 180 (N.C. 1981); Gregory v. State Dept. of Mental Health Retardation and Hospitals,
495 A.2d 997, 1002 (R.I. 1985).
100. See J.T. Hobby & Sons, 274 S.E.2d at 180.
101. See Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Okla. 1985).
102. See Belarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Systems Co., 269 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978).
103. See J.T. Hobby & Son, 274 S.E.2d at 180.
104. See Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024.
105. 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
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fostering a homelike atmosphere, does not create a family within
even a modern, expanded definition. °6 The court held that a
home inhabited by eight unrelated, mentally retarded adults under
constant professional supervision violated a deed restriction.0 7
However, the court promptly refused to enforce the covenant
"because to do so would contravene a long-standing public policy
favoring the establishment of such residences for the mentally
disabled.""1 8  This public policy rationale is the most direct
method used in the derogation of private property rights.
C. Criticism of Hill
Consistent with the trends, in Hill the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision depended upon circular logic"°9 and the redefini-
tion of so-called ambiguous terms.1 The court expanded the
definitions of those terms to near meaninglessness and ignored the
clear intent of the covenant restrictions and the contextual social
meaning of the terms therein.' If the term "family" is now any
group sharing a dwelling, the word has lost its original social
meaning and has become merely a metaphor for any group with a
common characteristic. The real covenant creates a property
right, 2 and this right should be taken seriously by the court,
which should give presumptive legal effect to the social meaning of
106. See id. at 1338.
107. See id. at 1340.
108. Id. at 1339.
109. See Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 869 (N.M. 1996). The
court concludes that the covenant is not violated by the use because that use fits within those
permitted. The permitted use as a single family dwelling is determined to be ambiguous and
so redefined by the court, which bases its redefinition on the need for the use to be
permitted. See id.
110. See id. at 867 (declaring the word, undefined in the covenant, to be ambiguous and
that nothing about the covenant suggests a discrete, traditional family unit).
111. See Brussack, supra note 68, at 34-36. Brussack defines the social meaning of a
word or expression to be the sense in which it would be understood by a well-socialized
speaker of English, and declares that the meaning is a fact, learned, discovered, or inherited,
but not invented. See id. at 45. Brussack also suggests that based on the character of the
subdivision "game" the ambiguity-construed-in-favor-of-free-use principle applied in these
cases would be more appropriately replaced by an ambiguity-apply-the-covenant rule. See
id. This rule is supported by the primary rules and goals of the subdivision game, which are
risk aversion and homogeneity. See id. at 46. Nonetheless, applied covenants may still be
refused enforcement in the face of paramount rights. See id.
112. See SINGER, supra note 90, at 434 (explaining that land use agreements, or
servitudes, are the source of correlative rights and duties with respect to property).
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the covenant. 113 Such rights must occasionally yield to paramount
rights; however, not to state projects, especially when there is no
compensation." 4 In cases involving community residences and
restrictive covenants, courts have ignored viable, veritable rights in
order to insure the success of a state policy favoring deinstitutional-
ization. 15 Increasingly, however, courts are finding in federal
antidiscrimination statutes the tools with which to implement their
unilateral policy decisions.
IV. Analysis of the FHAA as A Bar to Enforcement
A. Prohibitions and Protected Class
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA),"6
passed by Congress on September 12, 1988, amended the Fair
Housing Act of 1968117 to prohibit discrimination against the
disabled in public and private housing."8 The addition of the
disabled as a federally protected class under the FHA was intended
to extend housing protection to a group that was previously
excluded from antidiscrimination statutes or included in less
effective efforts.119 The FHAA also embraced within its protec-
tions transactions not included in the FHA, such as sales, rentals,
financing, brokering, appraising, the making and purchasing of
loans for dwellings, and local land use decision making. 21 The
amendments strengthened the FHA's enforcement provisions by
bestowing on the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) the power to refer cases involving breaches of conciliation
agreements to the Department of Justice (DOJ).' 2' HUD has
113. See Brussack, supra note 68, at 45. Brussack argues that courts should abandon the
ambiguity/free use rule and adopt an ambiguity/apply-the-covenant rule. See id.
114. See id. at 46.
115. See id.
116. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631,
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-42 (1988)).
117. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-19).
118. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1621-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-
06) (disabled included as protected class).
119. See Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 925, 934-42 (1994).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605.
121. See id. § 3610(c). Where conciliation fails, HUD may seek injunctive relief in the
federal courts or file an administrative complaint before an administrative law judge (ALJ),
see § 3610(e), who may then issue injunctive relief or impose penalties of up to $50,000. See
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reiterated the purpose of the amendments in its regulations stating
that "[n]o person shall on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap,12 2 familial status, or national origin, be subjected to
discrimination in the sale, rental, or advertising of dwellings, in the
provision of brokerage services, or in the availability of residential
real estate-related transactions., 123  Individuals, however, "whose
tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals" are exempted from coverage.1 24  Congress
intended for the provision to alleviate the fears of those who
believe that the nondiscrimination provisions could force landlords
and owners to rent or sell to persons whose tenancies could pose
such a risk.125 A landlord or owner asserting the existence of
such a threat must establish, by evidence of past acts or current
conduct and not generalized assumption, subjective fears, or
speculation, a nexus between the individual's tenancy and the
asserted threat.126
B. Reasonable Accommodation
The FHAA prescribes that a disabled person is entitled to
"reasonable accommodations" in rules, practices, services, or
policies, when necessary to afford equal opportunity.127 Congress
made explicit that "the application and enforcement of otherwise
neutral rules and regulations on ... land use in a manner which
discriminates against people with disabilities.., would be prohibit-
ed."128 Prohibited acts have included a municipality's refusal to
id. § 3612.
122. The FHAA defines "handicap" broadly as:
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such impairment, or (3) being
regarded as having such impairment,... but such term does not include current,
illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of
Title 21).
Id. § 3602(h).
123. 24 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (1993). Certain private clubs, religious organizations, and
housing for older persons are exempted. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607.
124. At least one commentator has contended that no evidence exists to support the
concept that persons with any covered disability who reside in community residences pose
such dangers. See Lauber, supra note 4, at 374-80.
125. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., at 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2189.
126. H.R. REP. No. 711 at 18-19, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179-80.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
128. H.R. Rep. No. 711, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
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allow substitution of a side yard for a zoning-required back
yard, l2 9 limitations on the number of residents in a home, 130 and
density limitations.'31
C. Exemption from Prohibition
The FHAA exempts from its prohibitions any "reason-
able ... restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants
permitted to occupy a dwelling."' 32 Recently, however, in City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,'33 the United States Supreme
Court held that such an exemption did not apply to a city's family
composition rule that permitted no more than five unrelated people
to live together in a house." Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion
noted that maximum occupancy restrictions have been traditionally
separate from zoning definitions of family,135 and stated that "[i]t
is curious reasoning indeed that converts a family values preserver
into a maximum occupancy restriction once a town adds to a
related persons prescription."'36 Generally, head-count caps, such
as the one dealt with in City of Edmonds, are intended to prevent
boarding or rooming houses in low-density, single-family-residence
zones and to control the adverse impact of communal living, such
as noise, traffic and parking problems.'37 Those local interests,
however, are disregarded when the FHAA is applied to facially
neutral restrictive covenants.
129. See, e.g., U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing
enforcement against community residence of homeless mentally ill or recovering addicts).
130. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1346
(D.N.J. 1991) (granting an injunction prohibiting enforcement of restrictive ordinance against
community residence); U.S. v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 423,429-43 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (holding that the city both intentionally discriminated against and failed to reasonably
accommodate a twelve-person adult foster care residence by failing to amend the definition
of family in its zoning ordinance to allow the community residence in residential districts).
131. See, e.g., U.S. v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 876-77 (W.D. Wis. 1991)
(challenging ordinance requiring 2500 feet between community residences).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
133. 514 U.S. 725 (1994).
134. See id. at 738. The provision was a zoning code definition of "family" as persons
related by genetics, marriage, or adoption, or not more than five unrelated people. See id.
135. Id. at 734.
136. Id. at 737.
137. See Leon Lazer, Fair Housing Act, 12 ToURO L. REV. 331, 333 n.7 (1996).
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D. Proscriptive Effect and Enforcement
Because the FHAA proscribes discriminatory effect as well as
intentional discrimination, public regulations and private covenants
that appear neutral may in application or enforcement become
unlawful discrimination. 3 ' When the Department of Justice
determines that a unlawful discrimination has taken place, the
Attorney General may sue to challenge local zoning practices
without proceeding through the administrative process.3 9 Most
notably, the DOJ has sued groups of residents in Bakersfield and
Berkeley, California; Fort Worth, Texas; and New Haven, Connect-
icut; on grounds that the residents violated the FHA when they
used leaflets, letters to legislators, or the court systems to protest
the intrusion of community residences into their neighbor-
hoods."
Like zoning ordinances, private restrictive covenants have
come under fire from courts using ammunition provided by the
FHAA. For example, in United States v. Scott,"' the Attorney
General sued homeowners alleging that they violated the FHAA
by interfering with the sale of a neighboring home to a non-profit
organization for the establishment of a community residence for
mentally and physically disabled persons.'42 The Scotts had
initially sued the owners of the home, the Haberers, in state court
to enjoin the sale on the basis of a single-family-residence-use-only
covenant. 143  The state court found no violation of the cove-
nant. 14' The Haberers subsequently filed a complaint with HUD,
which undertook an investigation, failed to successfully conciliate,
and filed charges before an AL. 14'5  The Scotts elected to pro-
ceed in federal district court, and HUD authorized suit. 146  The
138. See H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., at 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N.
2173, 2185. The three distinct causes of action under the FHAA are (1) discriminatory
intent, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to reasonably accommodate. See also supra Part
II.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1988); see also Kanter, supra note 119, at 960 n.237 (collecting
cases).
140. See Rights in Conflict, GOV'T. EXECUTIVE, November, 1995, at 54.
141. 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992).
142. See id. at 1556-57.
143. See id. at 1556.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Scott, 788 F. Supp. at 1557.
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Scotts admitted that their state court suit was founded on a fear of
property value depreciation due to the use of the Haberers' home
as a community residence for "mentally retarded people, ' 147 but
contended that the judge in that case had concluded that the suit
was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith.14' The district
court, finding that mental retardation is a protected disability, held
that the Haberers were "aggrieved persons" with standing to sue
under the FHA, and that the Scotts' conduct in attempting
enforcement of the neutral restrictive covenant violated the Fair
Housing Act under both the intentional discrimination and the
disparate impact prongs."' While the Hill court found the
evidence proffered to show intentional discrimination equivocal and
insufficient for that purpose,150 it did find that the Neighbors
violated the FHA under both the disparate impact151 and the
reasonable accommodation prongs.152
These enforcement cases illustrate that under the FHA, a
homeowner, concerned about the effects of a proposed community
residence on the peaceful enjoyment of her deed-restricted home,
may not in good faith attempt to enforce property rights expressed
in the deed and plat of the subdivision. It is of no import that the
homeowner's concerns may be rational or well-founded. Congress
has concluded that a person's fears are only misperceptions based
on outdated impressions of society's less fortunate. 53 Real and
continuing concerns may exist, particularly in a neighborhood with
young children, about the effects of a community residence housing
the mentally retarded, recovering alcoholics or drug addicts, acute
schizophrenics, unwed mothers, or AIDS patients. The disintegra-
tion of the homogeneity and "traditional family, 154 character of
the neighborhood, increased traffic, noise, parking problems, health
147. Id. at 1560.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1561-63; see also Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Puerto Rico for Dist.
for Arecibo, 752 F. Supp. 1152, 1168 (D. Puerto Rico 1990) (holding that the Fair Housing
Act was violated by enforcement of a restrictive neutral covenant in state court to terminate
the operation of a home for the handicapped).
150. Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 872 (N.M. 1996).
151. See id. at 874.
152. See id. at 876.
153. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
154. Used here, as in social context, to mean actually related by consanguinity or legal




concerns, and depreciation of property values are valid issues. If
a homeowner resorts to the court system to enforce the covenant,
or even leaflet, petition, or enlist the vocal support of neighbors in
opposition, that homeowner is inviting both HUD and Department
of Justice (DOJ) investigation, as well as prosecution by the
Attorney General.155
The exposure a homeowner faces is remarkable. A home-
owner may be held liable for compensatory damages, for revenues
lost by the community residence sponsor, for common law punitive
damages, and for civil penalties under the federal statute of up to
$50,000.156 One writer has observed, "If some people hate the
government, it is because they perceive that the government hates
them. Neighborhoods produced by hard work are being violated
by ... federal lawyers.'
157
V. Beyond the Character of the Neighborhood: DOJ and
HUD Investigation and Prosecution Under the FHAA
Federal investigations and prosecutions under the FHA are
prompting widespread concern and hostile responses.158 In 1992,
Bakersfield, California, residents David and Kathryn Fitzgerald,
William and Linda DeRose, and Charles Kirschenmann petitioned
a state court to enjoin the opening of a community residence for
mentally retarded adults.159 They argued that the use would
violate their subdivision's restrictive covenants, which limited the
homes to single-family residences, and also feared that the
commercial use of the home would lower property values. 6 ' A
judge issued a preliminary injunction, but the substantive case could
not proceed until resolution of a suit filed against the Fitzgeralds
and their neighbors in federal court by the DOJ alleging violations
of the FHA.161 The homeowners offered to withdraw their suit
on the covenants if the DOJ would withdraw its claim, but the DOJ
declined.62 Similar incidents have also occurred elsewhere.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 930 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
156. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612-14 (1988).
157. Paul C. Roberts, High Court's Ruling on Fair Housing Act Will Sow Hatred, STAR
TRIB., June 1, 1995, at 16A.
158. See Brian J. Taylor, HUDscapades, REASON 44, October 1995.
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United States v. Wagner' is another example of the federal
government's response to homeowners seeking to enforce cove-
nants. In July, 1991, the Wagners and several other residents of the
Ridgmar subdivision of Fort Worth, Texas, filed a state lawsuit to
prevent their neighbors, the Pines, from selling their home to a
county agency that planned to use the home as a community
residence for six mentally retarded children."6 The judge granted
a temporary restraining order (TRO)' 65 The residents and their
attorneys then became aware of a Texas law preventing the
exclusion of group homes based on the single-family residence deed
covenant on which the plaintiffs were relying."6 At one point, at
least one of the attorneys involved counseled that litigation was not
recommended. 67 The TRO was dismissed and the plaintiffs
dropped the Pines from the lawsuit but impleaded the county
agency as a defendant and maintained the suit until November,
1992.168
In 1995, the United States filed suit under the FHA against the
Wagners and other homeowners who joined in the state court suit;
the Pines intervened as plaintiffs. 69 The FHA prohibits discrimi-
nation in the sale of a dwelling or otherwise making unavailable or
denying such dwelling to any buyer because of the handicap of a
person living or intending to live in the dwelling after it is sold. 7 °
The Act also makes unlawful coercing, intimidating, threatening, or
interfering with any person in the exercise or enjoyment, or
because of aiding another person in the exercise or enjoyment, of
any right granted or protected by the FHA. 171 According to the
Act, it is also illegal to make, print, or publish any statement
indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a
disability.
172
The court found that the Wagners and other homeowners had
violated the FHA merely by filing the state court action.
73
163. 940 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
164. See id. at 973.
165. See id. at 978.
166. See Taylor, supra note 158, at 45.
167. See Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 979.
168. See id. at 978.
169. See id. at 973.
170. See id. at 979.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B) (1988).
172. See id. § 3617.
173. See Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 977.
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Concluding that the homeowners knew or should have known that
their suit was contrary to state law, if not federal law,t74 and that
their motive in filing suit was improper,'75 the court found viola-
tions of section 3617 by all of the state-court plaintiffs.176  The
Pines were then awarded over $11,000 in compensation for legal
expenses and emotional distress as well as, $8000 in punitive
damages; $5000 to be paid by the Wagners and the remainder split
between two other named plaintiffs, and over $46,000 in attorneys'
fees incurred by the Pines upon their intervention into the federal
suit.
17 7
In an August 1994 letter, American Civil Liberties Union legal
director Robert Shapiro voiced opposition to the investigation of
cases that should be protected by the First Amendment.'78
Several members of Congress also expressed concern.'79 HUD
contends that lawsuits are not protected by the First Amendment
when they are designed to promote an illegal purpose, are
motivated by an intention to discriminate, or are frivolous.' °
In August of 1995, a bill was introduced in the United States
Senate titled the "Fair Housing Reform and Freedom of Speech
Act of 1995. "181 The Bill would add to the maximum-occupancy
exemption of the FHA182 the inclusion of "any restriction relating
to the maximum number of unrelated persons permitted to occupy
a dwelling, if the purpose of the restriction is to restrict land use to
single family dwellings.' ' 183 The bill also adds that
174. See id. at 981. Apparently, the state-court plaintiffs' lawyers had relied upon a
summer intern's research memorandum that analyzed only state law and ignored federal fair
housing law. See id.
175. See id. at 982.
176. See id.
177. See United States v. Wagner, 930 F. Supp. 1148, 1155 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
178. See Rights in Conflict, supra note 140, at 4.
179. See Taylor, supra note 158, at 47. Taylorreports that Rep. Anthony Beilenson (D-
Cal.), Rep. Charles Canady (R-Fla.), and Sen. Slade Gordon (R-Wash.) voiced disapproval.
See id.
180. See id
181. S. 1132, 104th Cong. (1995). (Reintroduced as H.R. 589, 105th. Cong. (1997) with
slightly restricted language).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1988).
183. S. 1132, supra note 182, at § 2(a). H.R. 589 (1997) adds to § 2(a) "any restric-
tion ... governing the proximity of dwellings to each other, in connection with the occupancy
of a dwelling by a convicted felon, sex offender, or recovering drug addict." Id.
Congressman Brian P. Bilbray, who introduced the bill, stated that the changes "clarify the
intent of my legislation . . . H.R. 589 in no way diminishes or alters the anti-discrimination
provisions designed to protect care facilities for individuals with physical or mental
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Nothing in [the FHA] shall be construed to apply to any
otherwise lawful activity engaged in by one or more persons,
including the filing or maintaining of a legal action, that is
engaged solely for the purpose of (1) achieving or preventing
action by a governmental entity or official; or (2) receiving an
interpretation of any provision of this Act in a court of
competent jurisdiction."s
On September 22, 1996, testimony regarding the bill was taken
by the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee
on HUD Oversight and Structure."' Barbara Fahey, Mayor of
Edmonds, Washington, testified:
The passage of the 1988 amendment to the Fair Housing Act
effectively changed the ability of cities to maintain the standards
[of middle-class single-family neighborhoods] and enforce the
zoning regulations [enacted to protect their existence]. To
paraphrase several irate citizens in our community, in their
opinion, The Fair Housing Act has eroded the quality of their
neighborhoods and diminished the value of their property
investments without due process."6
Mayor Fahey applauded the bill's attempt to allow for
maximum-occupancy restrictions, but appealed for further mea-
sures, such as the City's ability to impose density limits 87 and to
require conditional use permits. 88 Mayor Fahey also suggested
that the FHA's definition of persons with disabilities be confined
to that of the Americans with Disabilities Act,189 and that munici-
palities be allowed to impose restrictions on community residences
"for the safety and welfare" of the community.19 The Mayor's
disabilities." Amendment to the Fair Housing Act: Hearings on H.R. 589 before the House
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 105th. Cong., Federal Document Clearing House Congressio-
nal Testimony, April 17, 1997 (statement of Hon. Brian P. Bilbray, U.S. House of Represen-
tatives).
184. S. 1132, supra note 182, at § 2(b).
185. See Amendment to the Fair Housing Act: Hearings on S. 1132 Before the Subcomm.
on HUD Oversight and Structure, 104th Cong., Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony, Sept. 18, 1996. (statement of Barbara Fahey, Mayor of City of
Edmonds, Washington).
186. Id. at 40-41.
187. See id. at 43. Mayor Fahey suggests a limit of one community residence per block.
See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 44.
190. Amendment to the Fair Housing Act: Hearings on S. 1132 Before the Subcomm. on
HUD Oversight and Structure, supra note 185, at 44.
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testimony also noted that the citizens of Edmonds acknowledge
that community residences often make better neighbors than single
families, that the elderly and the infirm need and should have such
options, and that a single community residence has little chance of
affecting property values, while a multitude have the potential to
do so. 9' The citizens, state Mayor Fahey, only want the FHA to
allow the preservation of the American dreams they all have
worked to achieve.192
In the same Senate subcommittee hearing, Victor J. Wolski, an
attorney with the Pacific Legal Foundation, and attorney for the
Bakersfield, California defendants in the 1993 DOJ suit mentioned
above, stated that Senate bill 1132 fails to protect property owners
who wish to rely on their private deed restrictions. 193 Unless such
covenants are added to the exemptions of section 807(B)(1) of the
FHA, 94 and unless the protection of suits by and against private
individuals to enforce such covenants is added to proposed section
821 of the bill, no protection for the covenanting homeowner is
effected.1 95 Wolski suggests, however, that a simple solution lies
near. The courts, he asserts, should adopt from antitrust law the
Supreme Court's test for whether a lawsuit falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment.1 96 Thereunder, only suits
that are objectively baseless and brought for malicious reasons may
be deprived of the constitutional right to petition the govern-
ment.1
97
Implementation of that rule may remedy what Wolski sees as
a public perception of unconstitutional governmental intrusion.
Wolsky indicts courts for their rising disregard for property rights,
despite constitutional protection in the Takings and Contracts
Clauses, the apparent notion that the First Amendment only
protects activity that furthers the government's policies, and the rise
of special privileges in the law so that certain groups are exempt
from contractual obligations based on their status.198  Rick
Disney, an attorney defending the homeowners in Wagner, noted,
191. See id.
192. See id. at 45.
193. See id. at 46 (statement of Victor Wolski, Pacific Legal Foundation).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(B)(1) (1988).
195. See Amendment to the Fair Housing Act: Hearings on S. 1132 Before the Subcomm.
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"[i]f people perceive that they can be punished for exercising their
constitutional rights, then they are less likely to petition for their
constitutional rights." '99 The government, he says, "is sending a
message in these suits that it is better not to file a suit in opposition
to a government action, or else.,
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VI. Conclusion
For nearly three decades, courts confronted with community
residence suits have read covenant language narrowly and disre-
garded the original intent of the drafters and the covenanting
parties. Judges and justices have propounded nonsensical interpre-
tations of terms. They have forgone connection with the social
context of the terms of those covenants and usurped the power of
the state legislatures to balance competing rights in order to
facilitate the deinstitutionalization of the disabled. Yet, it cannot
be argued that their motivation for doing so was not commendable.
Ultimately, however, the policy values of the people of the states
have been judged without benefit of referendum, legislative fact
finding, or political recourse to the citizenry. Covenants fail in this
light to afford the rights intended by the parties thereto.
So, too, does the FHAA fail to strike a meaningful balance of
competing interests. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
was without question an inspired piece of legislation, and no
antidiscrimination statute has yet evaded strong reaction from some
segment of affected population. Proponents of the Amendments
have no reason to fear that the law will not be enforced because
HUD and the DOJ have actively pursued cases under the law.
Societal attitudes about the disabled have changed and continue to
evolve. However, reasonable accommodation is also necessary for
those citizens whose homes, lives, investments, and dreams are
being thrust aside under the guise of integrated housing. Congress
must rechart the course on which some federal agencies have
embarked in the name of fair housing. The enactment the Fair
Housing Reform and Freedom of Speech Act, with added provi-
sions for further protection of private and public rights, would be
a step in the right direction. A proper balancing of the competing
rights in these cases will produce law that prevents invidious
discrimination but which allows for reasonable regulation of the
199. Rights in Conflict, supra note 140, at 5.
200. Id.
1998]
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size and placement of community residences. Reasonable accom-
modation of private contract rights and maximum occupancy,
density, and impact limits must be provided for in the law.
Without such provision, the neighborhoods that offer the attractive
qualities that attract family-oriented communities will rapidly
disappear, leaving only ghettoes of quasi-institutional small-group
facilities, thereby defeating the original goals of deinstitutionaliza-
tion.
Brian A. Kane
